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The quality gap in Chile’s
education system
José Luis Drago and Ricardo D. Paredes
T he quality gap in education between Chilean schools with 
different administrative structures (especially in the case of municipal 
schools and private subsidized schools) has long been a subject of 
analysis and discussion within the wider debate surrounding the relative 
efficiency and role of public education. Unconditioned differences in 
the results of standardized tests that point to higher levels of quality in 
private schools diminish when sociodemographic factors are controlled 
for, but the question as to what control variables should be used and 
which methodology is the most appropriate, as well as the extent of the 
reduction, all continue to be a subject of debate. Here we undertake 
a meta-analysis of 17 of the main studies that have been done on the 
subject. The analysis shows how sensitive the results are to the controls 
and estimation methods that are used. In the aggregate, private subsidized 
schools score approximately four points higher than municipal schools do. 
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Chile’s reform of its education system in the 1980s and, 
in particular, its introduction of a large-scale voucher 
scheme were designed to decentralize the system and 
to promote competition among publicly funded schools 
as a means of improving the quality of instruction 
(Aedo and Sapelli, 2001; Mizala, Romaguera and 
Ostoic, 2004). The government did provide funding for 
some private schools before the 1980s, but the reform 
expanded this arrangement so much that it reached a 
point where there was no significant difference between 
the level of government funding provided to private and 
public schools. Later on, however, institutionally based 
differences in working conditions for teachers did arise, 
as did differences in the schools’ organizational structures 
and, ultimately, their funding. The resulting difficulty of 
drawing direct comparisons between the performance 
levels of students in the different types of schools has 
sparked a heated debate about school administration 
and its effect on scholastic achievement. 
One of the central hypotheses put forward in the 
vast body of literature that has grown up around this 
issue is that the private schools are better-run. This 
proposition is primarily based on the sharp differences 
between the unconditioned scores on standardized 
tests of students in the different types of schools. The 
ensuing public debate has focused on the sustainability of 
public education, especially in view of the fact that, as a 
percentage of the total, the 80% public school enrolment 
rate registered in 1980 had dropped to less than 45% by 
2010 and that this steep reduction could be the result, 
at least in part, of the declining quality of the education 
being provided by the country’s municipalities, where 
inter-school segmentation, admissions screening and 
inequities are raising some doubts about the success of 
the earlier reforms.1 
The fact that sharp unconditioned differences are 
systematically found between the scores on standardized 
tests of students in one type of school or the other is 
not a sufficient basis for concluding that the quality of 
instruction provided by these schools differs, however. 
The view in some quarters is that the reform has led to 
a sharper stratification of the education system, with 
the most vulnerable students being left in the public 
schools, and that this accounts, at least in part, for the 
gap (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006). As discussed in a 
number of studies, this view has fuelled the controversy 
surrounding the quantification of these differences in 
terms of production functions of education. The findings 
have varied, with some authors arriving at conclusions 
that are diametrically opposed to those of others: some 
have determined that subsidized private schools are 
turning in better performances; others have found no 
statistically relevant differential; and still others (after 
isolating a number of factors) have argued that public 
schools are the best performers. An additional factor 
to be taken into account is that there are also sharp 
differentials between one public school and the next 
(Paredes and Paredes, 2009). 
The public policy implications of each of these 
different findings are, naturally, quite different. Gallego 
(2002), for example, contends that, despite the lack of any 
clear-cut difference between the scholastic achievement 
of pupils in municipal schools and those in subsidized 
private schools, the system in general has benefited 
from the increased competition and has consequently 
improved. Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) argue that the 
better results exhibited by subsidized private schools 
are primarily attributable to selection effects rather 
than to better administration. These differing positions 
are reflections of discussions that are taking place at 
differing levels, however. While the former position is 
taking an equilibrium analysis approach, the latter is not 
necessarily tackling the question from the same vantage 
point. Thus, even if private education were to prove to 
1  For a discussion of these issue, see Hsieh and Urquiola, 2003; 
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be “more efficient” than public education, this could 
be due to a student selection effect, and the underlying 
overall effects therefore cannot be identified unless a 
comprehensive study is conducted. The debate in Chile 
is thus centred on the point of departure, since the main 
point at issue at this juncture is whether or not such a 
gap actually exists at all.2
The purpose of this study is to delimit the discussion 
concerning empirical results by means of a meta-analysis. 
Meta-analyses are a tool that is widely used in the social 
sciences to distil and differentiate among the hypotheses 
put forward by many different studies when they fail to 
arrive at an agreed conclusion. It is only recently being 
applied in the field of education, however (e.g., Adesope 
2  The authors wish to thank the referee of the cepal Review for 
raising this point.
and others, 2010; Credé, Roch and Kieszczynka, 2010; 
and Bowman, 2010). Based on a very strict adherence 
to the eligibility standards put forward by Raudenbush 
and Bryk (2002), 17 studies on the efficiency differences 
between private and municipal schools in Chile were 
selected. A robust statistical model was then used to 
check whether the results of the meta-analysis fit in with 
a general, robust specification and estimation method. 
Four sections follow this introduction. Section II 
provides a description of the Chilean education system. 
Section III outlines the methodology that was used and 
describes the studies that were selected for the meta-
analysis. Section IV presents the results. The conclusions 
are set forth in section V. 
II
The Chilean education system
1. Background
Until the early 1980s, nearly 80% of the country’s 
schools were run by the State. The Ministry of Education 
was in charge of funding and running Chile’s schools, 
supervising and developing curricula, and investing in 
and building public school infrastructure. The system 
had high dropout and repeater rates, however, and was 
viewed as delivering a poor-quality education owing to 
its excessively bureaucratic nature, insufficient coverage 
and failure to provide schools with proper incentives.3 
This gave rise to a far-ranging reform of the education 
system based on the work done by Friedman (1955). 
Chile was one of the first countries in the world to 
introduce a reform of this type, or at least a reform of 
this scale and nature. State-run schools were handed 
over to the country’s municipalities and were financed 
with subsidies that did not differentiate between pupils 
attending municipal schools and those attending non-
fee private voucher schools (Mizala and Romaguera 
3  Hanushek (1998) indicates, for example, that, in 1970, the test scores 
for Chile’s students were 50% lower than the those of students in France 
and the United States and 20% lower than those of students in Japan and 
were only 10% higher than students in India and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran. Barro (1999) reported that Chile’s scores were 50% lower than 
what they would be expected to be given its level of development. For 
a detailed analysis, see Paredes and Hayl (2010).
1998). The reform gave rise to three types of schools: 
(i) municipal, State-funded schools (with funding 
provided by per-student subsidies); ii) privately run, 
State-funded subsidized schools (with funding provided 
by per-student subsidies); and (iii) privately run schools 
funded by tuition payments.
In order to make the education system better and 
more equitable so as to benefit the more vulnerable 
sectors of the population, in the early 1990s a number of 
programmes were put in place to supplement the school 
subsidy scheme, including special support programmes 
for schools serving underprivileged children (e.g., 
the “900 Schools” programme for poor sectors of the 
population, the Education Improvement Project and 
the Quality and Equity in Education Programme).4 In 
1991 the Teachers Statute, which re-established teacher 
benefits that had been withdrawn in the 1980s, was 
passed. Among other things, it re-introduced collective 
negotiations on wages and on job security for the faculty 
of municipal schools. Apart from the advantages of this 
agreement, however, the Teachers Statute has heightened 
the differences between one education system and 
another by making the administrative arrangements 
for municipal schools more rigid. In 1996 an incentive 
system —the National Performance Evaluation System 
4  The reasons why the effort to achieve greater equity takes the form 
of programme implementation rather than modifications of the subsidy 
are explained in Weinstein and Muñoz (2009). See also Weinstein, 
Fuenzalida and Muñoz (2010).
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(sned)— was put in place in order to recognize and 
enhance teachers’ best practices. 
In 1993 a new provision was introduced to supplement 
State funding. Under this statute, some of the subsidized 
schools were allowed to charge parents for a portion of the 
tuition, and subsidized private schools and some public 
schools were authorized to receive donations or grants, 
which would be deducted from the State subsidy.5 This 
led to a steep rise in private school enrolment that has 
cast some doubt over the sustainability of the municipal 
school system (Paredes and Pinto, 2009). 
These policies succeeded in bringing about a steep 
reduction in dropout rates and a steady increase in 
enrolment rates. The scores on the System for Measuring 
the Quality of Education (simce) tests, however, indicate 
that the quality of education remains quite limited and 
that striking differences between the performance of 
students in different socio-economic sectors continue 
to pose a major challenge.6 Hsieh and Urquiola (2003) 
argue that the reform spurred an exodus of middle-class 
students from municipal schools to private subsidized 
ones, which left the municipal schools with a much 
greater proportion of students from vulnerable sectors 
and therefore drove down their average scores. Along 
these same lines, Mizala, Romaguera and Ostoic (2004) 
point out that municipal schools, unlike their private 
counterparts, have to accept all applicants (as long as 
they have room) and that it is quite difficult from them 
to expel students. 
The consensus view is that these three types of 
schools are serving sharply stratified socio-economic 
groups. As shown in table 1, the majority of students in 
5  Secondary municipal schools can opt for the co-financing system if 
authorized to do so by a majority of parents and guardians.
6  Chilean students scored substantially higher on the 2006 Programme 
for International Student Assessment (pisa) test, especially in the 
humanities (oecd, 2008). The reason for this improvement would be 
a highly interesting research topic. 
municipal schools are from the lower-income quintiles 
(70%), and this has been the situation for a number 
of years now. In contrast, subsidized private schools 
receive a larger percentage of middle-income students 
and even a considerable number of students from high-
income sectors. 
The overall results are not good either. The principal 
performance indicator for education in Chile is the 
standardized simce test, and the scores on that test are 
much higher in fee-paying private schools than they are 
in the other two types of educational establishments.7 
2. Context and results
Once the reform had been carried out, questions began 
to arise as to its repercussions and implications for 
the quality of education. One way of approaching 
this issue, which, although not a study of the reform’s 
overall effects, could shed some light on one of its 
direct repercussions, is to analyse the performance 
differentials between municipal and subsidized private 
schools. There have been a plethora of studies on the 
subject in recent years, but they have arrived at very 
different conclusions, and this has added fuel to the 
debate over the years in ways that have often steered 
it into the realm of differing ideologies. 
The conceptual and empirical foundations underlying 
this discussion clearly extend beyond the specific case 
of Chile. Hanushek (2003) suggests that, in recent years, 
the cost of public education has risen sharply without 
attaining the expected results. Chubb (2001) contends 
that, if education were privatized, schools would have 
powerful incentives for cutting costs and that this would 
push them to innovate and become more efficient. Others 
argue that this type of system would prompt private 
schools to cut costs in ways (e.g., recruiting less qualified 
teachers at lower salaries) that would lower the quality 
of the education that they provide. In addition, this 
system could lead to discriminatory practices whereby 
schools would give preference to students that would 
be less costly for them (Levin, 2002). In Hoxby’s view 
(2001), this kind of situation arises because, in a flat-rate 
subsidization system, subsidized private schools have no 
incentive to take on students who are in more vulnerable 
situations, since they will require a larger investment in 
order to achieve better scores. 
Chile’s case is alluded to indirectly by Gallego 
(2002), who has developed a model for determining the 
effect of competition between municipal and subsidized 
7  For further information on the scores, see www.simce.cl
TABLE 1
Enrolment, by type of school
(Percentages)
Income quintile
Type of school I II III IV V
Municipal 42.39 27.60 16.06 10.66 4.24
Private (subsidized) 22.34 22.63 21.26 20.59 13.37
Private (fee-paying) 4.64 4.64 4.49 12.37 75.26
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of the 2006 National 
Characterization Socio-economic Survey (casen) database.
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private schools. Gallego finds a positive correlation 
between competition and performance, particularly in 
subsidized private schools, and interprets this as being a 
consequence of the existence of stronger incentives for a 
rapid response to potential competition. This would also, 
however, have a positive impact on municipal schools. 
Sapelli (2003), while working to draw general lessons 
from these experiences, talks about a form of market 
duality, inasmuch as Chile’s public schools and subsidized 
private schools are not subject to the same external 
rules. Municipal schools, unlike their subsidized private 
counterparts, are subject to “soft” budgetary constraints 
in the sense that they often receive additional funding 
from the municipality, which is a disincentive for more 
efficient operations. On the other side, subsidized private 
schools have the option of obtaining more funding from 
the students’ parents. Carnoy (1997) questions the idea 
that competition will have a positive effect and instead 
argues that such a system will only benefit higher-income 
students because, if schools are in competition with one 
another, they will try to select for the top students.
Valenzuela, Bellei and de los Ríos (2008) find 
that the crucial issue in Chile’s education system is the 
striking differentials between the scores of students in the 
different types of schools, which are closely correlated 
with household income. Tokman (2002) finds that, 
following the reform, the municipal system lost its best 
students, who transferred to subsidized private schools, 
which lowered public schools’ scores. By the same 
token, Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) state that, after the 
reform, the private subsidized schools’ better showing 
was primarily due to the fact that they had selected out 
the best students. 
Fontaine (2003) maintains that the use being made 
of the co-financing arrangement attests to the fact that 
many parents are willing to cover part of their children’s 
educational costs if this will provide them with a higher-
quality education and more individual attention. In 
addition, subsidized private schools are required to use 
10% of their tuition proceeds to provide scholarships for 
poor students, which clearly is of great benefit for poorer 
sectors of the population. Given the highly stratified 
nature of the education system, Tokman (2002), Carnoy 
(1997) and, in particular, McEwan (2003) all contend 
that the poorer performance of students in municipal 
schools is attributable to a peer effect (i.e., when less 
gifted students are grouped together, they are less likely 
to do well scholastically). This last proposition is open 
to discussion, since it has not been definitively resolved. 
There are, for example, schools of thought according 
to which this factor is irrelevant, and the segregation 
of students by abilities allows educators to use specific 
techniques that are geared towards overcoming their 
limitations. 
The above discussion highlights the fact that a 
comparison of the performance of students in fee-paying 
private, subsidized private and municipal schools is 
a complex proposition. A series of studies have been 
conducted in an effort to assess relative performance 
levels using econometric models that are designed to 
take all the various factors affecting student performance 
into consideration. The choices made when selecting 
the operational approach, the variables to be taken into 
account and the estimation methods to be used are also, 
however, part of the discussion. As noted by Bellei 
(2005), the findings of studies designed to answer the 
question as to whether subsidized private education is 
better are determined, to a great extent, by the research 
methodology that they use, since quite small changes 
can have a strong impact on their ultimate results.
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1. Meta-analysis
Meta-analysis is a technique for reviewing and aggregating 
the findings of different studies in an attempt to answer 
a given scientific question (Letón and Pedromingo, 
2001). It began to come into use in the social sciences 
and agriculture in the 1930s. The term “meta-analysis” 
was coined by Glass (1976) and, since the 1980s, its 
use has become widespread, especially in the field of 
medicine and the social sciences. The greatest advantage 
that it offers is that it provides a way of determining how 
a number of different studies tie in with one another 
(Lipsey and Wilson, 2001), which, in turn, makes it 
possible to arrive at an overarching conclusion concerning 
any given hypothesis by first determining what the 
strengths and weaknesses of each study are and why 
their findings differ. 
More recently, meta-analysis has come into use in 
the field of education. Adesope and others (2010) have 
used it to estimate the effect of bilingualism on cognitive 
outcomes. Credé, Roch and Kieszczynka (2010) have 
used it to determine the correlations between students’ 
grades and class attendance. Bowman (2010) has 
employed the methodology to try to establish a relationship 
between a school’s racial diversity and its students’ 
cognitive development. 
A meta-analysis has two stages: (i) compiling 
relevant studies, and (ii) relating the selected studies 
to one another. In the compilation stage, a formal set 
of selection criteria has to be established in order to 
minimize the bias generated by the choice of studies. 
In the case at hand, the selection criteria are: (i) that the 
studies refer either directly or indirectly to differences 
in academic performance between public and private 
schools in Chile; (ii) that they were published after 1997 
(so as to limit the range of studies to the more recent 
ones); (iii) that they have had a fairly notable impact in 
the field, as measured by the stature of the publisher or 
the number of times that they have been cited in other 
research papers; (iv) that their estimates have been arrived 
at through the use of econometric models; and (v) that 
they have used representative datasets.
The techniques used in the second stage of a meta-
analysis are classical statistical methods. Meta-analyses 
are used for statistical inference, measurement of the 
overall effect size, variance estimation, confidence 
intervals, and statistical contrast and its significance.
The methodology for relating a set of studies to one 
another is based on the model proposed by Raudenbush 
and Bryk (2002), who used hierarchical linear modelling 
(hlm) to obtain the mean and overall variance of the 
parameter to be estimated. It makes sense to use hlm 
because of the nested structure of the variables in question. 
The model has two levels. The first is related to each 
study’s results and their variance, while the second refers 
to the overall parameter to be estimated (the parameter 
being sought) and the variance among the studies being 
analysed. The first step is to obtain the standardized mean 
of the effect to be analysed for each study included in 
the meta-analysis, which is represented by dj. For study 
j, this is obtained by (1). Thus, for the j-nth study, dj is 









where YEj is the mean for the experimental group; Ycj 
is the mean for the control group; and Sj is the standard 
deviation of the difference between the two. Equation 
(1) yields a standardized value for the standard deviation 
for each study, thereby assigning a greater weighting to 
studies with less variability. 
At the first level, the model is:
 d e e N Vj j j j j= +δ , ~ ( , )0  (2)
For each study j, ej is the error associated with the 
variable dj. The statistical distribution of ej is a normal 
one with a mean of 0 and a variance of Vj, while δj 
corresponds to the real value of the variable in study j. 
In this case, the relevant variable (linked to the parameter 
“subsidized private school”) obtained from each study 
is dj, and its corresponding variance is Vj (both known 
values). At the second level, a similar model is used:
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where:
γ0 is the overall mean, and
uj is the error at the second level, which distributes 
uj ∼ N(0, τ).
Thus, by introducing equation (3) into (2), for each 
study we obtain the final model:
 d u ej j j= + +γ 0  (4)
Therefore, dj distributes normally dj ~ N(γ0 ⋅ τ0 + Vj). 
This yields the overall parameter (γ10) and the overall 
standard deviation (τ0). It is possible to estimate whether 
τ0 is actually statistically different from 0 so that we can 
then determine if a relevant difference exists among 
the selected studies. To do so, we use a hypothesis test 
where H0:τ0 = 0, with the statistic:
 Q Vj j











1 .  This statist ic has a 
distribution of χ2 with j-1 degrees of freedom, while 
Q is the term discussed by Hedges (1982). To estimate 
δj (Bayes estimator), the steps involved are as follows: 
on the one hand, .j is an unbiased estimator of δj with 
a variance of Vj, but, on the other, γ0 can be regarded as 
a common estimator for each δj. The optimum estimator 
for each study can be calculated using the optimum 
Bayes estimator (δ j
∗ ) (Lindley and Smith, 1972), since 
it combines the two parameters discussed above in an 
optimum manner:
 δ λj j j jY
*
.
ˆ= + −1 0( )λ γ  (6)
















From (7) it can be inferred that, when the sample 
is highly reliable, there will tend to be a marked 
preponderance of .j in the value of δ j
∗ , given its 
proximity. This means that λj will have a value close to 
1. If, on the other hand, the sample is not reliable, Yˆ0  
will tend to have a greater weight in the value of 
δ j
∗, while λj will tend towards a value close to 0. 
2. Selected studies and data
A total of 17 studies were selected. These studies use 
a nationwide sample of simce test scores to estimate 
the effect by means of multiple regressions using 
ordinary least squares (ols), the Heckman correction 
(hc), propensity score matching (psm) or hierarchical 
linear modelling (hlm). The most complete model in 
which the estimates and conclusions were the most 
coherent was used for each study. Of course, given the 
differences in the models, bases, levels of aggregation, 
specifications and estimation techniques used in the 
various studies, their results are not the same. And 
this is precisely what the meta-analysis is intended to 
address. Table 2 shows that the biggest differences are 
in the year, grades and subjects used for the sample. 
The models’ levels of aggregation also differ, since 
some studies worked at the school level and others at 
that of individual students. The study samples vary as 
well, while screening differences and a lack of data in 
some cases could account for part of the differences in 
their results. Imputation methodologies can, of course, 
also explain inter-study differences. 
The methodologies used also differed. In the first 
generation of studies —Mizala and Romaguera (1998); 
Bravo, Contreras and Sanhueza (1999); McEwan and 
Carnoy (2000); Gallego (2002); Tokman (2002); and Sapelli 
(2003)— the results were analysed while controlling for 
individual, family and geographic factors at the school 
level. ols were used to estimate an educational output 
function; no consensus was reached, although subsidized 
private schools did tend to yield somewhat more favourable 
results. These studies suffer from a number of limitations, 
however, with the main one being that their data were 
compiled at the school level, which did not allow them 
to look at within-school variations.
The second-generation studies were conducted at 
the level of individual students using ols and hc models: 
McEwan, 2001; González, Mizala and Romaguera, 2002; 
Sapelli and Vial, 2002; Bellei, 2005; Contreras, Bustos 
and Sepúlveda (2007); and García and Paredes, 2010. 
McEwan (2001), Contreras, Bustos and Sepúlveda (2007) 
and García and Paredes (2010) took the endogeneity 
of school choice into consideration to some degree 
and Heckman-corrected their ols models. Mizala and 
Romaguera (2003), Manzi and others (2008) and Mizala, 
Romaguera and Ostoic (2004) based their estimates on 
two-level hlm models so as to address the heterogeneity 
of students attending different schools.
Each study controls for different variables, although 
they almost all share a certain number of them. The 
168
ThE qUALITy GAP In ChILE’S EdUCATIon SySTEM  •  JoSé LUIS dRAGo And RICARdo d. PAREdES
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 1
third column of table 3 shows the variables included in 
each model. All the studies control for socio-economic 
characteristics, although the specific variable changes 
from one to the next (for example: vulnerability index, 
linear income, quadratic income). Socio-economic 
status is systematically approximated by the parents’ 
level of education, either at the average level per school 
or for individual students, depending on the nature of 
each model. Table 3 shows the results for each of the 
17 studies. Ten of the studies suggest that subsidized 
private schools provide a better education; five find no 
statistically significance difference, and two indicate that 
municipal schools offer a better-quality education.
The variation in these results is quite striking, 
with conditioned differences ranging from -6.948 to 
18.107, with a mean standard deviation of 6.338. Both 
the mean (4.358) and the median (3.431) are positive, 
which suggests that most of the studies point to a better 
performance on the part of subsidized private schools 
than municipal schools.
In summary, there are some variables that have 
been used in almost all of the studies, while there are 
others that have been used in only one or a few (e.g., 
sex of the student, presence of indigenous students) 
(for a detailed description, see Drago, 2010). No clear 
relationship between the types of control variables and 
differences in performance outcomes for municipal 
and subsidized private schools emerges, however. 
Nonetheless, there does appear to be a difference in 
terms of the number of controls, especially in the case 
of fixed effects identified by hlm, in which case the 
difference, in either direction, declines.
TABLE 2
Datasets for each study
Study Year/grade/subjecta Level Model Sampleb
Mizala and Romaguera (1998) 1996/4thE/M and L School ols 5 133 (63.3%)
Bravo, Contreras and Sanhueza (1999) 1996/4thE/M School ols 5 110 (63.0%)
McEwan and Carnoy (2000) 1996/4thE/M School ols 5 490 (67.7%)
McEwan (2001) 1997/4thE/M Student hc 158 872 (67.4%)
Gallego (2002) 1996/4thE/M and L School ols 4 904 (62.9%)
González, Mizala and Romaguera (2002) 1999/4thE/M Student ols 202 754 (88.8%)
Sapelli and Vial (2002) 1998/2ndS/L Student hc 46 223 (25.2%)
Tokman (2002) 1996/4thE/M School ols 2 789 (37.2%)
Sapelli (2003) 1999/4thE/M School ols 4 784 (61.5%)
Mizala and Romaguera (2003) 1998/2ndS/M Student hlm 69 402 (30.9%)
Mizala, Romaguera and Ostoic (2004) 1999/4thE/M Student hlm 226 860 (83.5%)
Bellei (2005) 2002/4thE/M Student ols 199 112 (83.3%)
Contreras, Bustos and Sepúlveda (2007) 2005/4thE/M Student hc 161 619 (61.1%)
Manzi and others (2008) 2005/4thE/M Student hlm 233 338 (88.2%)
Mizala, Anand and Repetto (2009) 2002/4thE/L Student psm 77 921 (32.6%)
García and Paredes (2010) 2005/4thE/M Student hc 225 206 (85.1%)
Mizala, Repetto and Lara (2009) 2006/2ndS/M Student psm 20 000 aprox.c
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a Year, grade (E: elementary, S: secondary) and subject (L: language, M: mathematics) are characteristics of the datasets of simce scores 
used to develop the models.
b For the studies conducted at the school level, the size of the sample corresponds to the number of schools that were surveyed. For the 
studies conducted at the student level, the sample size corresponds to the number of individual students in that sample, but it will differ 
enormously depending on data imputations or the criteria used to eliminate observations in which data were missing. 
c In this case, samples from different years were used.
ols: ordinary least squares. hc: Heckman correction. hlm: hierarchical linear modelling. psm: propensity score matching. 
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TABLE 3
Characteristics of the selected studies






Socio-economic level/fee-paying private, subsidized private or municipal school/ mixed 






Socio-economic level/ fee-paying private, subsidized private or municipal school, mixed 
school/ preschool education/ aid programmes/acceptance of schoolwork/ student-teacher 




Socio-economic level/parents’ average level of education/ completion of elementary school 
by parents /fee-paying private, subsidized private or municipal school/number of students 
in school/series of teacher characteristics/geographic index/ rural
13.073 (2.478) +
McEwan (2001) Household income and average household income for the grade /parents’ average level of 
education /indigenous mother/ sex of student /number of books in home /fee-paying private, 
subsidized private or municipal school/percentage of indigenous mothers / rural
-6.948 (3.940) -






Household income and household income2 /income deviation per school/parents’ average 
level of education /fee-paying private, subsidized private or municipal school /full-length 
school day/number of students enrolled and number of students enrolled2 /Payment per 
student / teachers’ experience/ student-teacher ratio
11.794 (0.293) +
Sapelli and  
Vial (2002)
Household income/parents’ level of education/indigenous family/subsidized private or 
municipal school
6.900 (1.50) +
Tokman (2002) Logarithm of income/vulnerability index and poverty line index / parents’ level of education 
/number of persons in household/subsidized private or municipal school/ teachers’ 
experience/percentage of teachers with university degrees, men/number of teachers /hours 
worked/ rural
5.827 (49.057) =
Sapelli (2003) Logarithm of mothers’ level of education and standard deviation of mother’s level of 





Socio-economic level of school/household income and household income2 / fee-paying 
private, subsidized private or municipal school/ mixed school/school with science and 
humanities curricula or schools with science, humanities and vocational curricula / logarithm 





Socio-economic level of school and student /length of school day in hours /students who 
repeat a grade / preschool education/ fee-paying private, subsidized private or municipal 
school/ mixed school/ full-length school day/ logarithm of the number of students enrolled 
/ teachers’ experience/ student-teacher ratio/ rural
3.431 (0.751) +
Bellei (2005) Logarithm of household income and socio-economic level of the school/ parents’ level of 
education / parents’ expectations/ sex of student/students who repeat a grade/ number of 
books in the home/ fee-paying private, subsidized private or municipal school/ percentages 
of students regularly attending the school and repeating a grade /school expels students if 





Household income, household income2 /parents’ level of education /sex of student / municipal 
or subsidized private school / rural/ number of students/ teachers’ experience/ selection
0.470 (0.340) =
Manzi and others 
(2008)
Socio-economic level of school and of individual students/ number of books in the home/
number of persons per household/ municipal or subsidized private school/number of 
students/selection/ parent participation and use of information/ rural/ northern, central or 
metropolitan areas
-3.261 (0.674) -
Mizala, Anand  
and Repetto  
(2009)
Socio-economic level of school and of individual students / parents’ level of education/ 
parents’ participation and expectations/ preschool education/ municipal or subsidized private 
school / selection
10.072 (2.195) +
García and  
Paredes (2010)
Household income. household income2/ parents’ level of education / parents’ participation/ 
fee-paying private, subsidized private or municipal school/ payment per student/ team 
management/teachers’ qualifications/teacher evaluations/ monitoring of teachers/ rural
7.260 (0.346) +
Mizala. Repetto  
and Lara (2009) 
Socio-economic level of school and of individual students / parents’ level of education / 
parents’ participation and expectations/students who have to repeat a grade/number of books 
in the home/ preschool education/ municipal or subsidized private school / selection
3.613 (1.892) +
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a Differences (in points) in simce scores calculated in each study; positive values indicate a better outcome for subsidized private schools 
while negative values indicate a better outcome for municipal schools.
b  +: positive effect for subsidized private education; =: no statistically significant difference; -: negative effect for subsidized private education 
(90% significance).
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1. Meta-analysis
The results of the meta-analysis are presented in 
table 4. The figures show that subsidized private 
schools out-perform municipal schools by 3.9 points, 
with a confidence interval of 95%. The same table also 
shows that the standard deviation between studies is 
5.9, which indicates how sensitive the selected models 
are to the datasets used and their specification. Once 
again, a homogeneity test of this parameter rules out 
the homogeneity hypothesis (p < 0.01).
Figure 1 provides a clearer picture of the results 
of the meta-analysis and of the different studies. For 
each study, a numerical value is given on the horizontal 
axis for each coefficient of the dummy variable for 
a subsidized private school (relative to a municipal 
school) and the respective confidence interval. Each 
IV
results
study is represented by a square whose size corresponds 
to its weighting in the meta-analysis, which bears a 
direct relationship to the precision of each estimator, 
and by a horizontal line that shows the confidence 
interval of the estimator (the greater the quotient of 
the estimator and its variance, the greater that study’s 
weighting). The rhombus at the bottom represents the 
estimated value yielded by the meta-analysis of all 
the studies (3.923), while the distance between the 
horizontal sides represents the standard deviation of 
that estimate. The dotted vertical line rising from the 
rhombus provides a point of reference for gauging 
how the estimate for each study compares to the 
overall estimate.
The optimum Bayes estimators, i.e., the estimator 
for each study corrected by the overall estimated effect, 
can also be obtained (see table 5).
TABLE 4
results of the meta-analysis for all of the selected studies
Overall parameter Minimum value Maximum value Standard deviation Q (homogeneity test) Value p
3.923 0.851 6.996 5.900 942.200 0.000
Source: Prepared by the authors.
FIGURE 1
Graphic representation of the meta-analysis results
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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Mizala and Romaguera (1998)
Bravo, Contreras and Sanhueza (1999)
McEwan and Carnoy (2000)
McEwan (2001)
Gallego (2002)
González, Mizala and Romaguera (2002)
Sapelli and Vial (2002)
Tokman (2002)
Sapelli (2003)
Mizala and Romaguera (2003)
Mizala, Romaguera and Ostoic (2004)
Bellei (2005)
Contreras, Bustos and Sepúlveda (2007)
Manzi and others (2008)
García and Paredes (2010)
Combined
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2. A more robust specification
In order to determine how much the results of the meta-
analysis may have been influenced by the rigidity of the 
specifications, a model can be estimated using the most 
robust possible structure. At the same time, we can use 
both ols and hlm estimates in order to check whether 
or not the results are sensitive to the method chosen. In 
other words, if the results obtained after estimating a 
model using two different methods —ols and hlm— 
with a highly robust specification (without any bias 
due to the omission of variables) differ by something 
on the order of 4 points, then the controversy could 
be attributable to a specification problem, rather than 
to the grade chosen or the screening of the sample. If, 
however, they differ by an amount that is substantially 
different from the results of the meta-analysis, then 
the controversy about the reasons for this difference 
continues, although the nature of the point at issue can 
be defined somewhat more precisely. The scores on the 
simce math test for students in the fourth grade in 2008 
will be used for this purpose. 
One particularly interesting aspect in this case is 
that the robust specification takes selection variables 
into account, since selection is presumably more of a 
factor in subsidized private schools than in municipal 
ones. And, in fact, 67% of the subsidized private schools 
report that they do practise some sort of admissions 
screening, whereas, for municipal schools, the figure 
is 37%. We therefore include a set of interactive terms 
that also make the estimate more robust. 
In sum, the specification for the two-level hlm 
model is as follows. At the student level:
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ij j j ij j ij j ij
j
















9 pPad rij ij
3 4
 (8)
where Yij is the score on the simce mathematics test of 
student i, who attends school j. rij is the level-1 error 
term, which is distributed r Nij ∼ ( , )0
2σ , where σ 2 
represents the level-1 variance. 
The model at the school level (level 2) is as 
follows: 
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where γ00, γ01, …, γ08 are the level-2 coefficients. 
µj0 is the level-2 error term, which is distributed 
µj0~N(0, τ00) and covariance τ00.
Four models are estimated using ols and hlm; this 
permits different controls to be used (see table 6).
The results given in table 6 show that the fewer 
controls there are (model A), the greater the differential in 
favour of subsidized schools. These results, particularly 
in the case of the hlm model with more controls, are 
consistent with the results of the meta-analysis in that 
they show that subsidized private schools out-perform 
municipal schools. The differential yielded by this model 
is substantially greater than the differential suggested by 
the meta-analysis, however. This could be attributable 
–apart from possible factors such as aggregation– to the 
grade and year chosen. 
TABLE 5
Estimators and confidence intervals of Bayes optimums
Study Result Corrected result Minimum Maximum
Mizala and Romaguera (1998) 1.981 2.030 0.340 3.720
Bravo, Contreras and Sanhueza (1999) -0.494 -0.430 -1.270 0.350
McEwan and Carnoy (2000) 13.073 11.580 7.820 15.350
McEwan (2001) -6.948 -3.630 -9.050 1.790
Gallego (2002) 1.774 1.850 -0.170 3.880
González, Mizala and Romaguera (2002) 11.800 11.770 11.270 12.250
Sapelli and Vial (2002) 6.900 6.680 4.290 9.080
Tokman (2002) 5.827 3.510 -6.290 13.300
Sapelli (2003) 0.790 1.580 -3.640 6.810
Mizala and Romaguera (2003) 18.107 9.470 2.010 16.930
Mizala, Romaguera and Ostoic (2004) 3.431 3.430 2.210 4.660
Bellei (2005) -0.310 -0.270 -1.280 0.750
Contreras, Bustos and Sepúlveda (2007) 0.470 0.48 -0.080 1.04
Manzi and others (2008) -3.261 -3.170 -4.270 -2.070
García and Paredes (2010) 7.260 7.250 6.680 7.810
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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The discussion about the relative efficiency of public 
schools has been particularly intense in Chile, where 
private education is funded by the State under a scheme 
that is essentially the same as the arrangements in place 
for financing public education. The debate has been 
fuelled by differences in the amount of funding provided 
under the “shared financing” arrangement, the additional 
funding furnished by the municipalities, the possibility 
of admissions screening and the different employment 
regimes that have been instituted. This debate has also 
been spurred by the fact that different studies on the 
subject have offered up different conditioned results. 
The objective of this study has been to clarify the 
empirical issues by applying a meta-analysis to the 17 
most influential studies on the subject. Our findings 
make it possible to delimit the speculation surrounding 
the actual difference in performance between private 
subsidized schools and municipal schools by gauging 
that difference at something on the order to 4 points. 
While this is in the neighbourhood of one tenth of the 
standard deviation of the achievement test in question, 
it nonetheless represents a significant difference from an 
educational standpoint, especially in view of the striking 
stability of school performance outcomes. 
This analysis does not, of course, settle the question 
as to the role of public education. The fact that, on average, 
private education out-performs public education tells us 
little about what types of policies we need to introduce 
in order to benefit the very considerable percentage of 
students who attend municipal schools and have no real 
chance to transfer to another type of school. What these 
findings do suggest, however, is that attention should 
be focused on determining what practices and what 




results of the application of ols and hlm
to fourth-graders’ simce mathematics scores 
Variables
ols hlm
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Student level
Constant 224.49 (0.311)* 181.76 (1.08)* 230.39 (0.37) 186.73 (1.08)*
Logarithm of income 1.46 (0.18)* 0.54 (0.12)*
Education of father 0.55 (0.13)* 0.07 (0.12)
Education of mother 1.43 (0.14)* 0.49 (0.13)*
Preschool education 4.78 (0.25)* 5.01 (0.23)*
Sex 5.10 (0.23)* 5.65 (0.23)*
Indigenous mother -2.39 (0.39)* -2.20 (0.39)*
Parent expectations 8.43 (0.89)* 7.78 (0.84)*
Number of persons in household -1.55 (0.07)* -1.00 (0.07)*
School level
Constant -20.19 (0.36)* -12.66 (0.89)*
Subsidized private school 21.71 (0.23)* 7.20 (0.30)* 22.22 (0.80)* 10.53 (1.27)*
Fee-paying school 68.56 (0.44)* 30.93 (0.62)* 59.47 (2.50)* 48.33 (2.82)*
Logarithm of socio-economic level 19.39 (0.48)* 12.66 (0.67)*
Urban 8.54 (0.34)* -15.77 (0.43)* 7.01 (1.13)* -13.90 (1.32)*
Class size 0.13 (0.006)* 0.23 (0.08)*
Class size 2 -0.004 (0.002)* -0.002 (0.001)
Logarithm of teachers’ experience 3.91 (0.15)* 4.32 (0.31)*
Selection 0.40 (0.25) 8.46 (2.86)*
Source: Prepared by the authors.
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